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FROM CODLING, TO BOLM TO VELEZ: TRIPTYCH
OF CONFUSION*
Aaron D. Twerski**
It is a rare event for a leading Court of Appeals to hand down
three major opinions in a quickly developing field of law within a
one-year time span. One would have expected that, having been
granted the opportunity to speak thrice on the subject of products
liability' a full decade after the formal adoption of strict liability
by leading courts throughout the country,2 the New York Court
of Appeals would have seized the moment to crystallize the law
and rid itself of shopworn concepts. Such expectations were only
partially realized. The court did in fact break new ground in
apparently establishing strict tort liability as an independent
cause of action,3 expanding tort liability to second collision dam-
ages,4 and limiting the scope of disclaimers against non-
bargaining third parties. 5 However, despite three separate oppor-
tunities the court neglected to clarify the nature and scope of its
commitment to the strict tort liability concept. By failing to con-
* The author gratefully acknowledges the able assistance of Harvey Weinig, a June
1974 graduate of the Hofstra Law School. Mr. Weinig's contribution goes far beyond that
of research assistance. His perceptions added much to the substance of the article.
This paper was prepared during a period in which the author was involved in a study
sponsored by the National Science Foundation, entitled Product Liability: A Study of the
Interaction of Law and Technology, (Grant Number GI-34857). The report of the study
appears in 12 DUQUESNE L. REv. (Spring, 1974). Although this paper developed apart from
that study, the contributions of Professor William Donaher of the Duquesne Law School
and Professors Alvin Weinstein and Henry Piehler of Carnegie-Mellon University-co-
members of that NSF study team-to my overall thinking is gratefully acknowledged.
** B.S. University of Wisconsin; J.D. Marquette University; Teaching Fellow, Har-
vard Law School, 1966-67; Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Hofstra University
School of Law.
1. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y. 2d 330, 298 N.E. 2d 622, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 461 (1973); Bolm
v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y. 2d 151, 305 N.E. 2d 769, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 644 (1973); Velez v.
Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y. 2d 117, 305 N.E. 2d 750, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 617 (1973).
2. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 338-40, 154 N.W.2d
488, 500-501 (1967); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129
(1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 621, 210 N.E.2d 182, 187 (1965); State
Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1966); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424,
427, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (1966); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 459, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63
(1967).
3. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 469
(1973).
4. Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973).
5. Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350
N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973).
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front the policy considerations underlying contributory fault, dis-
claimers, and antiquated duty rules, the New York court has
placed itself in the position of being at the same time among the
most progressive and retrogressive courts in the nation in the
product liability field. Such an uneven performance deserves seri-
ous academic analysis.
I. CODLING V. PAGLIA: Is NEW YORK SERIOUS ABOUT STRICT
LIABILITY?
Codling is a most difficult case to read. Within the text of
only seven printed pages the court addressed such issues as (1)
the abolition of privity;1 (2) the evidentiary burden on plaintiff
in a strict liability case;7 (3) the effect of product misuse in a strict
liability action;8 (4) the consequences of plaintiffs failure to dis-
cover a defect in the product;9 (5) the consequences of plaintiff
behavior that is unrelated to the product defect; ' " (6) the impact
of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co." on a pre-Dole voluntary settle-
ment,' 2 and (7) the issue of comparative fault in the post-Dole
era.' 3 Given the scope of the decision and the brevity of the opin-
ion one is not surprised to find that the case does not deal ade-
quately with the rather substantial questions raised by the court.
What is astonishing, however, is the realization that the court
failed to perceive that it was deciding issues of great moment for
the next decade of product liability litigation. By failing to advert
to its own leading decisions, as well as the leading product liabil-
ity decisions throughout the country, one wonders whether the
court fully appreciated the potential impact of its pronounce-
ments in Codling on these highly significant and heavily debated
issues. Before examining the arguments in greater detail, a review
of the facts seems in order.
On August 2, 1967, Christino Paglia was driving a four month
old Chrysler sedan with just over 4,000 miles on the odometer
when suddenly his vehicle crossed the solid double line on the
highway and collided with an auto coming from the opposite
direction driven by Frank Codling. At no time prior to the acci-
6. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 338, 298 N.E.2d 622, 626, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 466 (1973).
7. Id. at 340, 298 N.E.2d at 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
8. Id. at 343, 298 N.E.2d at 629, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
9. Id. at 343, 298 N.E.2d at 629, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
10. Id. at 344, 298 N.E.2d at 629, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
11. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
12. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 344, 298 N.E.2d 622, 630, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 471 (1973).
13. Id. at 344, 298 N.E.2d at 630, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
[Vol. 2, 1974]
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dent had Paglia experienced any difficulty with the steering
mechanism. At the time of the accident he was driving along at
a speed of 45 to 50 miles per hour, when suddenly and unexplain-
ably his vehicle started to drift over the solid double line into the
northbound lane. There was evidence that at no time prior to
impact did Paglia either blow his horn or apply his brakes. Paglia
sued Chrysler for negligence and breach of implied warranty. The
jury returned a verdict for plaintiff on implied warranty grounds
alone. The court used the occasion to set forth the elements of a
cause of action for strict products liability: 14
We accordingly hold that, under a doctrine of strict prod-
ucts liability, the manufacturer of a defective product is liable
to any person injured or damaged if the defect was a substantial
factor in bringing about his injury or damages; provided: (1)
that at the time of the occurrence the product is being used
(whether by the person injured or damaged or by a third person)
for the purpose and in the manner normally intended, (2) that
if the person injured or damaged is himself the user of the prod-
uct he would not by the exercise of reasonable care have both
discovered the defect and perceived its danger, and (3) that by
the exercise of reasonable care the person injured or damaged
would not otherwise have averted his injury or damages.
A. Goldberg and Mendel and Codling and ....
The plaintiff, Christino Paglia, it will be recalled, brought
suit on grounds of negligence and breach of implied warranty of
merchantability. He was victorious on implied warranty grounds
alone. The court affirmed the finding of defect in favor of both
Paglia and Codling under a "doctrine of strict products liability."
The altogether obvious next question: Is this doctrine of "strict
products liability" one arising under the Uniform Commercial
Code or is it a common law tort doctrine? It is with considerable
diffidence that the author poses the question. Since the advent
of strict liability in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 5
and the American Law Institute pronouncement in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, there is probably no ques-
tion that has been more heavily debated." Courts have attempted
14. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 469 (1973).
15. 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965). Comment m ad-
dresses itself to the tort nature of strict liability and frees the concept from limitations
imposed by the Uniform Commercial Code. It provides:
"Warranty." The liability stated in this Section does not rest upon negli-
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with marginal success to. draw distinctions between situations
where the U. C. C. provisions should apply and those where the
tort strict liability concept should prevail. Some courts have
opted for a Code analysis in all products cases including personal
gence. It is strict liability, similar in its nature to that covered by Chapters 20
and 21. The basis of liability is purely one of tort.
A number of courts, seeking a theoretical basis for the liability, have re-
sorted to a "warranty," either running with the goods sold, by analogy to cove-
nants running with the land, or made directly to the consumer without contract.
In some instances this theory has proved to be an unfortunate one. Although
warranty was in its origin a matter of tort liability, and it is generally agreed
that a tort action will still lie for its breach, it has become so identified in
practice with a contract of sale between the plaintiff and the defendant that the
warranty theory has become something of an obstacle to the recognition of the
strict liability where there is no such contract. There is nothing in this Section
which would prevent any court from treating the rule stated as a matter of
"warranty" to the user or consumer. But if this is done, it should be recognized
and understood that the "warranty" is a very different kind of warranty from
those usually found in the sale of goods, and that it is not subject to the various
contract rules which have grown up to surround such sales.
The rule stated in this Section does not require any reliance on the part of
the consumer upon the reputation, skill, or judgment of the seller who is to be
held liable, nor any representation or undertaking on the part of that seller. The
seller is strictly liable although, as is frequently the case, the consumer does not
even know who he is at the time of consumption. The rule stated in this Section
is not governed by the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, or those of the
Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is not affected by limitations
on the scope and content of warranties, or by limitation to "buyer" and "seller"
in those statutes. Nor is the consumer required to give notice to the seller of his
injury within a reasonable time after it occurs, as is provided by the Uniform
Act. The consumer's cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his
contract with the person from whom he acquires the product, and it is not
affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between the seller
and his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the product into the
consumer's hands. In short, "warranty" must be given a new and different
meaning if it is used in connection with this Section. It is much simpler to regard
the liability here stated as merely one of strict liability in tort (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); Markle v. Mulhol-
land's, Inc., 509 P.2d 529 (Ore. 1973); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb.
546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal,
Rptr. 17 (1965); Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800
(1970). See generally, Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folley Also Traynor's? or Should the
Judge's Monument be Moved to a Firmer Site? 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 469 (1974); Shanker,
Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commen-
tary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communications Barriers, 17 CASE W.
REs. L. REV. 5 (1965); Littlefield, Some Thoughts on Products Liability Law: A Reply to
Professor Shanker, 18 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 10 (1966); Franklin, When Worlds Collide:
Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974
(1966); Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uni-
form Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965); Reitz,
Warranties and Product Liability: Who Can Sue and Where, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 527 (1973).
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injury cases'" whereas others have shifted to a strict liability ap-
proach even in economic loss cases.'9 It has been clear for almost
a decade that depending on whether the tort approach or the
U. C. C. approach is utilized such issues as privity, notice of
breach, statutes of limitation, and disclaimers may receive differ-
ent treatment by the courts. 0 Yet, here in New York in a rather
standard personal injury products case, we are attempting to
guess whether or not the ground rules for products litigation lie
within the purview of the Code or tort law.
The failure of the New York court to place this new strict
products liability doctrine into a doctrinal perspective, given the
national debate on the subject, is disturbing, but given the pre-
vious debate within the New York Court of Appeals on the sub-
ject, the omission is simply mystifying. Four years ago, Mendel
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. ' created a national sensation of
sorts. On October 25, 1965, plaintiff, Cecile Mendel opened and
was walking through the entrance doors leading from the street
into the premises of the Central Trust Company when the door
struck her, causing her to fall to the ground and sustain personal
injuries. Some seven years prior to the accident the offending door
had been installed in the Central Trust Company building by the
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company. Plaintiff brought suit against
Pittsburgh Plate Glass claiming the door was defective and that
it breached an implied warranty of fitness for particular use. The
issue presented to the court was whether the case was to be gov-
erned by the tort or contract statute of limitation. If the tort
statute governed, then plaintiff had three years from the time of
injury to bring suit. If the contract statute controlled, the statute
18. See, e.g., Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 53 Del. 477, 172 A.2d 252
(1961).
19. See, e.g., Santor v. A & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
20. See, e.g., Handy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1971); Tucker v.
Capital Mach., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Pa. 1969); Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas
Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964); Everhart v. Rich's Inc., 128 Ga. App. 319, 196
S.E.2d 475 (1973) Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140 (1967).
See generally, Murray, Pennsylvania Products Liability: A Clarification of the Search for
a Clear and Understandable Rule, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 391 (1972); Murray, Products
Liability-Another Word, 35 U. PTr. L. REv. 255 (1973); Murray, Random Thoughts on
Mendel, 45 ST. JoHN's L. Ray. 86 (1970).
Professor Murray argues cogently that the courts have adopted an over-literal ap-
proach to the reading of the U.C.C. If courts were willing to indulge in sophisticated
analysis, sections such as 2-318, 2-607 and 2-725 would not stand in the way of plaintiff
recovery since these sections provide leeway for the consumer-user who suffers personal
injury as a result of a defective product.
21. 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
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in effect at the time of Mendel imposed a six-year limitation from
the time of sale. Plaintiff argued vociferously that Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp.2 2 had established a "tort strict liabil-
ity" doctrine in New York. The Court of Appeals took the occa-
sion to review the then New York strict liability approach. They
said:n
The appellants argue that Blessington does not apply to the
instant case because our decision in Goldberg v. Kollsman In-
strument Corp. (12 N.Y. 2d 432) created in favor of third-party
strangers to the contract, a cause of action in tort and not in
warranty and, therefore, the three-year-from-the-time-of-the-
injury, rather than the six-year-from-the-time-of-the-sale, limi-
tations period should apply. We do not agree. When Goldberg
was before us, we were confronted with the issue of whether or
not a cause of action other than in negligence should exist in
favor of those persons not in privity with the contract of sale.
After determining that the cause of action should exist, two
avenues were open to us-either to establish, as other jurisdic-
tions already had, a new action in tort, or to extend our concept
of implied warranty by doing away with the requirement of
privity. While there is language in the majority opinion in
Goldberg approving of the phrase "strict tort liability", it is
clear that Goldberg stands for the proposition that notwith-
standing the absence of privity, the cause of action which exists
in favor of third-party strangers to the contract is an action for
breach of implied warranty. The instant action being one for
personal injuries arises from a breach of warranty, it is our opin-
ion that Blessington controls and, therefore, the applicable
Statute of Limitations is six years from the time the sale was
consummated (CPLR 213, subd. 2).
Justice Breitel, joined by two other dissenters, reviewed the liter-
ature and leading cases.24 He contended that the tort theory was
clearly emerging as the dominant products theory and should
govern the case. Yet, here we are again in Codling, in a case based
on implied warranty of merchantability, wondering whether the
strict liability doctrine is based in tort or in contract. The lan-
guage of Codling has a clear tort orientation but the holding is
on warranty grounds. Indeed, two product decisions later in
Velez, 21 when dealing with the validity of a disclaimer provision,
22. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
23. 25 N.Y.2d 340, 343, 253 N.E.2d 207, 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (1969).
24. Id. at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
25. 33 N.Y. 2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973).
[Vol. 2, 1974]
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the most that the court is willing to say is that that "strict prod-
ucts liability sounds in tort rather than in contract. ' 2 Perhaps
this does now signal that Codling is indeed tort based, but how
different is this language from that of Goldberg v. Kolisman In-
strument Corp. which used tort terminology, and was later
defined in Mendel as only loosely tort but truly based in con-
tract. It is strange indeed but one searches the Codling opinion
in vain for even a footnote to Mendel. Query: Could Mendel
have been forgotten so short a time after it created a major storm
within the legal community?2 7 Or was the court hedging and still
undecided as to which approach to favor? There remains the
possibility that the New York court does not wish to get caught
up in the tort-contract debate and that it proposes to face dis-
claimer, statute of limitation, and notice of breach problems in-
dependent of any doctrinal setting.28 If indeed this is the approach
the court intends to follow then it should have imparted this
information through the appropriate use of dicta in Codling. Too
much has transpired in New York case law to have to start the
guessing game once again.
29
I. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE TO STRICT LIABILITY:
AN UNEXPLAINED PHENOMENON
The author's critique of Codling has heretofore focused on
what the court failed to say. Undoubtedly the silence will eventu-
ally be broken and the issues will be resolved. More serious are
26. Id. at 124, 305 N.E.2d at 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
27. See, e.g., Symposium on Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, 45 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 63, 71, 76, 86, 96, 104 (1970); McLaughlin, Annual Survey on N.Y. Law,
Civil Practice, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55, 61 (1971); Murray, Products Liability-Another
Word, 35 U. PiTT. L. REv. 255, 269 (1973).
28. Under this approach the court would involve itself in an enlightened statutory
analysis of the U. C. C. to determine whether its provisions were meant to effect plaintiffs
in personal injury litigation. See Murray, Random Thoughts on Mendel, 45 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 86 (1970).
29. As this article was going to press the Appellate Division (Second Department)
decided Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc. (N.Y. L.J. April 18, 1974). The case pre-
sented the Mendel problem to a post-Codling court. On October 2, 1967 plaintiff, an eight
year old boy accompanied his aunt to a self-service laundry. The aunt placed some wet
laundry in an extractor machine to extract excess moisture from the laundry in order to
facilitate quicker drying. The lid of the extractor was supposedly incapable of opening
during the machine's operating cycle. Due to an alleged defect the lid of the extractor
popped open while the machine was still in operation. The infant plaintiff reached in to
remove some laundry and his arm was caught in the rotating machine causing multiple
fractures eventually resulting in the amputation of his arm.
The Mendel problem was raised by the defendant, Boch Laundry Machine Co. Boch
had sold and delivered the allegedly defective machine in 1959 some eight years prior to
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the court's pronouncements on contributory negligence as a de-
fense to strict product liability. Here the court has spoken defini-
tively on perhaps the most crucial issue in the entire field of
products law. Again, one would have expected that when faced
with such a momentous issue the court would have addressed the
serious policy conflicts with appropriate argumentation and dis-
cussion of the relevant authorities. Instead, the New York Court
of Appeals placed itself in an extreme minority among the na-
tions' courts in a decision which is almost totally devoid of refer-
ence to the leading cases and scholarly works that have so thor-
oughly weighed the competing policies." The end result is that
the accident. Under Mendel, defendant was entitled to the six-year statute of limitation
which ran from the time of sale. The issue was raised in terms of the six-year statute of
limitation (former Civi PRAc. AcT, § 48, N.Y. CPLR § 213) because the four year limita-
tion period set forth in § 2-725 of the U.C.C. has only prospective application from
September 27, 1964.
In a lengthy and well reasoned opinion Justice Shapiro concluded that Codling had
established a strict tort liability doctrine and that Mendel would not apply to the new
tort doctrine which would instead be governed by the three year statute of limitations for
personal injury (N.Y. CPLR § 214), Subdivision 5) which runs from the time of injury.
Under the reasoning of the court plaintiffs now have three possible causes of action in a
product liability case: (1) common law negligence (2) breach of warranty and (3) strict
products liability, and will have the option of the three-year from time of accrual or four
year from time of sale statute of limitation depending on the cause of action pursued.
The Appellate Division was split 3-2 with the two dissenting justices unconvinced
that the Court of Appeals is prepared to overrule Mendel. The decision bears out the
author's position that Codling and Velez are susceptible to different interpretations. Al-
though this author believes the majority has reasoned to the correct and clearly preferable
result there is good reason for the conservation of the dissent. If the Codling court meant
to make Mendel a dead letter they had reason to clearly delineate that strict liability was
a pure tort doctrine.
30. The following courts have rejected contributory negligence as a defense to a
products case and have followed Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(n) that only
voluntary and unreasonable assumption of the risk is a defense: Ferraro v. Ford Motor
Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966); O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz., 556, 447 P.2d
248 (1968); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App.2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968);
DeFelice v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Conn. Sup. 164, 255 A.2d 636 (1969); Williams v. Brown
Manufacturing Co., 45 Ill.2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Baker v. Rosemurgy, 4 Mich.
App. 195, 144 N.W.2d 660 (1966); Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co., 445
S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.
1967); Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Perfection Paint & Color Co. v.
Konduris, 258 N.E.2d 681 (Ind. 1970); Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171
N.W.2d 201 (1969); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash.2d 833, 454 P.2d 205 (1969); Benson
v. Beloit Corp., 443 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1971) (applying Oregon law); Mooney v. Massey
Ferguson, Inc., 429 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1970) (applying New Mexico law); Vernon v. Lake
Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 488 P.2d 302 (1971); Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., CCH PROD.
LIAB. Rv'rR. 7107 (Sup. Ct. Idaho 1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Mathews, CCH PROD. LIAB.
RPTR. 7105 (Sup. Ct. Miss. 1974); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., CCH PROD. LIAB.
RPTR. 7097 (Sup. Ct. Okla. 1974). L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODuCrS LIABILITY, § 8.06
(1973); W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, § 67 (3d ed. 1964). See also R. Keeton, Assumption
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New York litigants must face the most oppressive contributory
negligence doctrine in the country without even having the cold
comfort of believing that the court was fully cognizant of the
ramifications of its decision.
Under Codling, in order for plaintiff to recover for injuries
sustained from a defective product, he must satisfy the court
that: (1) the product was being used for the purpose normally
intended; (2) that if the plaintiff was himself the user of the
product he would not, by the exercise of reasonable care, have
both discovered the defect and perceived its danger and (3) that
by the exercise of reasonable care the person injured would not
otherwise have averted his injury.3'
A. Normal Use
The first requirement is not exceptional. There is general
agreement that this is nothing more than another way of stating
the proximate cause issue. 2 Thus, even if the manufacturer ad-
mits that a product is defective, the injury must fall within the
scope of the risk of the defect. If, for example, a defective automo-
bile tire with inadequate beading, which was sold for normal
driving conditions, is subjected to race car use, liability may be
in question. The defense is not contingent upon the tire being free
of Products Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contri-
butory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1972); G. Epstein,
Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 267 (1968).
There is little authority supporting the court's opinion and even that was not cited.
New Hampshire and Wisconsin have both upheld contributory negligence as a defense to
a strict liability case. See Stephan v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 266 A.2d 855 (N.H. 1970) and
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). The Wisconsin position is of only
marginal importance since Wisconsin is a comparative negligence jurisdiction and thus
even a finding of contributory fault will not bar a plaintiff from recovering, but only reduce
his recovery. The court in Codling does cite to Maiorino v. Weco Products, 45 N.J. 570,
214 A.2d 18 (1965) but neglects to indicate that the New Jersey Supreme Court has had
second thoughts about the wisdom of Maiorino. In Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc., 53
N.J. 463, 251 A.2d 278 (1969) the court indicated general agreement with Restatement
§ 402A(n) and found it possible to explain existing New Jersey cases under Restatement
principles. For further developments supporting contributory negligence as a defense see:
Coleman v. American Universal of Florida, Inc. 264 So.2d 451 (D. Ct. of App., Fla. 1972);
Florida Power and Light Co. v. R.O. Products, Inc., CCH PROD. LIAB. RPTR. 7145 (U.S.
Ct. of App. 5th Cir. 1974) (recognizing ambiguity in Florida law as to whether contributory
negligence or product misuse is a defense). Hensley v. Sherman Car Wash Equip. Co.,
CCH PRoB. LIB. RPrR. 7141 (Colo. Ct. of App. 1974) (no decisional Equip. Co., CCH on
contributory negligence as defense to strict liability).
31. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461,
469 (1973) (emphasis added).
32. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assump-
tion of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93, 96 (1972).
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of defect-it may well be a poorly manufactured tire; rather, it
arises because of a policy determination that even a manufacturer
of a poorly beaded tire should not be subject to liability when his
product is put to a use beyond the parameters of normal condi-
tions for that product. Where the line is drawn is clearly a policy
matter, and the courts are well guided by almost a half-century
of proximate cause cases which have given content to this rather
elusive concept.
The abnormal use limitation on liability is a rather limited
one: for example, what if plaintiff was driving his car with the
poorly beaded tire at a rate of speed ten miles over the speed
limit? Clearly no one is prepared to declare this behavior to be
outside the tolerance of normal use. If plaintiff is denied recovery
against the manufacturer, (as he may be under Codling on contri-
butory negligence grounds) it will not be because he is abusing
the product in such a fashion as to bring the product use outside
the scope of the risk created by the defect. Or should plaintiff
continue to use the tire after he should have noted some breakage
on its surface, which arose from the defective beading, plaintiff
would not be precluded from recovering because he subjected the
tire to abnormal use. His continued use after some notice, actual
or constructive, that something may be wrong with the tire is
clearly a normal and foreseeable consequence. No one would
deign to cut off liability on such facts on the ground that the tire
was being subject to abnormal use.
B. Duty to Discover the Defect
The serious problem with contributory fault in Codling arises
from the second and third provisos set forth by the court as a
prerequisite to plaintiff recovery.33 First, it must be established
that if plaintiff was himself the user of the product he would not
by the exercise of reasonable care have both discovered the defect
and have appreciated the risk. To appreciate how onerous a bur-
den plaintiff must carry in New York a comparison with strict
liability standards, as articulated in Restatement § 402A, is in
order. Comment n, entitled Contributory Negligence, provides: 34
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based
33. In New York plaintiff has the burden of proving freedom from contributory negli-
gence in a standard negligence case. Fitzpatrick v. International Ry. Co., 252 N.Y. 127,
169 N.E. 112 (1929). This burden is to remain with the plaintiff even in a strict liability
action.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs, § 402A, Comment n (1965).
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upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule
applied to strict liability cases (see section 524) applies. Contri-
butory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such
negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in
the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence.
On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which
consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encoun-
ter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of
assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other
cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the
defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds
unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it,
he is barred from recovery.
The Restatement position, which has been widely adopted, 5
specifically frees a plaintiff from a duty to inspect a product for
defects. The reason for removing the burden from the consumer
is quite clear: The thrust of strict liability law has been to place
on the manufacturer the duty of manufacturing a reasonably safe
product." We are no longer concerned as to whether the manufac-
turer has acted reasonably in putting the product in the market
place. The shift from substandard manufacturer conduct to prod-
uct defectiveness as the criterion for liability should mean at the
very least that a consumer has a right to expect a non-defective
product. As long as negligence was the criterion for liability, a
consumer had no absolute right to expect that a product would
reach his hands in a non-defective condition. Manufacturers bore
no responsibility for producing a defect-free product. If the defen-
dant used reasonable care in the manufacturing process, he would
not be held liable. However, once the sine qua non for manufac-
turer liability is product defectiveness, it makes no sense to place
a duty to inspect before use on the consumer.3 7 If he is entitled to
a non-defective product, why should he be required to inspect it
to assure himself that the product he is about to use is non-
defective?
The duty to inspect formulated by the Codling court has a
strange twist to it. Apparently the court was concerned that it
35. See cases cited supra, note 31. See also, Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 838 (1966).
36. See, e.g., Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965);
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
37. But cf., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 (3)(b), and Comment8, (1962 official
text and comments) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.I. See also, Noel, Defective Products:
Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93,
110, 118 (1972).
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had created too harsh a doctrine of contributory negligence. To
temper justice with mercy the court provided that the failure to
inspect would not bar recovery unless the plaintiff, by use of
reasonable care, would have both discovered the defect and per-
ceived its danger. Thus it is not enough that a reasonable man
would have discovered the defect, unless the discovery would
have made a reasonable man aware of the risk inherent in the
defect. If this be a mitigating factor, this author is at a loss to
understand how the blow is softened. If a reasonable man would
have discovered the flaw, and the flaw would not have appeared
to carry risks to the user, then the user is simply not contributo-
rily negligent.3 7- The discovery of a flaw in a product does not ipso
facto make the user contributorily negligent-it is only when a
reasonable man would not continue to use the product because
he perceives an unreasonable risk to himself that we censure his
conduct by denoting it as negligent. What then is gained by creat-
ing the appearance of a double pronged test for contributory
fault? The court could have simply said that the traditional no-
tions of contributory negligence govern in a product liability case.
There are two other possible explanations worthy of consider-
ation. The requirement that a reasonable man would have both
discovered the defect and perceived the risk might not refer to the
reasonable man at all, but rather to the particular plaintiff in-
volved in the litigation. The New York court might simply have
chosen an awkward method of articulating the Restatement posi-
tion that voluntary and unreasonable assumption of the risk is a
defense to a strict liability case.38 Given the close parallelism
between the two pronged Codling test and the "voluntary and
unreasonable" standard of the Restatement, the possibility exists
that the court believed that it was merely paraphrasing the
Restatement. Codling, however, contains no language which
would substantiate this approach. The Restatement position is
rooted in subjective assumption of the risk and the defense can-
not be made out unless there is proof that plaintiff himself did
in fact appreciate the risk.39 Codling is riddled with language
pointing to the traditional "reasonable man" test which is based
37.1. See Weinstein, Twerski, Donaher, and Piehler, Product Liability: The Interac-
tion of Law and Technology, 12 DUQUESNE L. REV. (1974).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment n (1965).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORS § 402A, Comment n and Section § 496D, Com-
ment c (1965).
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on a wholly objective standard. 0 Thus the issue is not what this
plaintiff understood but whether a reasonable user would have
discovered the defect and perceived the risk.
A more plausible explanation is that the court sought to
tighten up contributory negligence somewhat by requiring that
plaintiff not be barred unless a reasonable plaintiff would have
discovered the defect and also have perceived the particular risk
which actually developed. Thus it would not be sufficient if plain-
tiff merely failed to discover a defect and that a reasonable man
would not have continued to use the product; we must also deter-
mine that a reasonable man would not have used the product
because he would have perceived the precise harm which might
befall him if he did continue to use the product. If this is what
the court meant then one may question the doctrinal soundness
of their decision. The requirement of perception of risk in as-
sumption of the risk proceeds from the premise that we censure
plaintiff's conduct because he voluntarily decided to encounter a
risk and to take his chances. To determine whether in any given
instance plaintiff's conduct is worthy of censure we seek to evalu-
ate just how much of the risk plaintiff did in fact perceive. How-
ever, what the court apparently proposes in Codling is an inquiry
as to whether a reasonable man would have perceived this precise
risk if he would have been reasonably attentive. We must now
question what is to be gained by this inquiry. There appears to
be only one answer: if the contributory negligence in failing to
inspect would not have disclosed the risk, then it is not the proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiff's harm. If the court is choosing this
method to say that proximate cause, with regard to contributory
negligence, is to be read narrowly and that plaintiffs should not
be held to be the proximate cause of their own harm unless the
harm suffered comes clearly within the ambit of the risk, then
there is very little cause for concern. This is, after all, the tradi-
tional approach to contributory negligence. 41 If however, the court
is applying the "precise risk" test to contributory negligence for
the mere purpose of delimiting the operation of the defense, it is
making an unholy compromise. The major burden for product
safety belongs on the manufacturer. Speculation as to whether
the plaintiff would have discovered the precise risk which he did
40. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); see also, Velez v. Craine
& Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973).
41. Smithwick v. Hall & Upson Co., 59 Conn. 261, 21 A. 924 (1890). See also W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 421 (4th ed., 1971).
Hofstra Law Review
not in fact discover adds very little to consumer protection.
C. General Contributory Negligence
Although imposing a duty to inspect on the user-consumer
is, in this author's opinion, ill conceived and almost wholly un-
supported by authority; there is good reason to believe that the
impact on actual results in products litigation will be minimal.
Since the issue is whether a reasonable man would have discov-
ered the defect and perceived the risk arising therefrom, the issue
will be, in the main, for the jury. Given prevailing attitudes to-
ward consumer expectations, it is doubtful that juries will be
anxious to find that a consumer should have discovered a defect.
The second part of the Codling contributory negligence test, how-
ever, is bound to have a profound impact on who prevails in a
products case. It provides that in order for plaintiff to recover, it
must be established "that by the exercise of reasonable care the
person injured or damaged would not otherwise have averted his
injury or damages. '42
Let us return for a moment to the hypothetical discussed
earlier in which plaintiff was speeding while travelling on a poorly
beaded tire. In our earlier discussion we established that plain-
tiffs activity could not be considered to be an abnormal use of
the product. Speeding at 35 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour
zone is hardly an abusive use of a tire. But suppose that we
establish that had plaintiff been travelling at the speed limit, he
would have been able to avoid the accident entirely. His contribu-
tory negligence is now clearly a substantial factor in the causation
of his injury. Should contributory negligence be a defense? The
New York court answers in the affirmative. To this writer the
result seems outrageous.
The duty of producing a non-defective product has been
placed on the manufacturer. The harm that has befallen the
plaintiff is directly within the risk of the defect against which the
manufacturer has a duty to guard. The defendant has a clear duty
to manufacture tires that will not disintegrate at 35 miles per
hour. By establishing the contributory negligence defense we are
removing from the defendants' liability picture a whole range of
foreseeable users to whom a clear duty is owed-viz., duty to
manufacture a nondefective product. Why then the exculpation
for the defendant?
One may argue that this is common to contributory negli-
42. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 470 (1973).
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gence wherever it is utilized as a defense. That is, negligent defen-
dants have a general duty to protect even contributorily negligent
plaintiffs. If plaintiffs fail to recover, it is because the law cen-
sures their activity, not because the defendant's activity is con-
doned. There is, however, a major distinction between the prod-
ucts liability picture and general negligence litigation.43 In the
standard contributory negligence case defendant is involved in
negligent activity (e.g., speeding), and the plaintiff in contributo-
rily negligent activity (e.g., negligent lookout). An accident oc-
curs and both participants are the proximate causes of the harm.
Although, each could reasonably foresee the possibility of the
other's act, the defendant did not provide the matrix for the
plaintiff's action. In products litigation, foreseeability of plain-
tiff's use of products is technically a moot question. Defendants
can and do know the incidence of the plaintiff's use of their prod-
ucts. How a consumer will interact with a product is a function
of product design and even of quality control. If a certain category
of product use is found subject to an affirmative defense, it is a
statement that defendants bear no responsibility to protect plain-
tiffs from that form of product use. An exemption from liability
for a certain category of product use has thus been created for the
benefit of defendants, and that may well affect a manufacturer's
considerations of product design and quality control. It is true
that defendants remain responsible to those plaintiffs who are not
contributorily negligent and may, therefore, retain high product
standards. That however cannot be known outside the context of
a particular manufacturer's litigation experience with any given
product. We cannot escape the conclusion that excluding certain
categories of plaintiff behavior from the liability picture is an
important statement as to whether we wish to grant a large cate-
gory of foreseeable users protection from certain kinds of product
failure. Who better needs non-defective tires than one travelling
at speeds in excess of the speed limit?
Returning to Codling, the Court of Appeals sent the case
back for trial to determine whether Paglia's general conduct con-
stituted contributory negligence. The case is not clear as to what
aspect of Paglia's conduct may have constituted contributory
negligence. It appears, however, that Paglia failed to brake in
time and at no time prior to impact did he blow his horn.44 If the
43. This thesis is developed at some length elsewhere. See, Twerski, Old Wine in a
New Flask: Restructuring Assumption of the Risk, 60 IowA L. REv. 1 (1974).
44. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 335, 298 N.E.2d 622, 624, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (1973).
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defect which caused Paglia to cross over the center line into the
opposite lane of traffic was the steering mechanism, then the
conduct with which the court was concerned was that of plaintiff
in failing to adequately respond to the steering problem after the
steering problem had caused the car to veer out of control. The
court phrased the question to be decided on remand as follows: 5
There remains, however, the question whether Paglia inde-
pendently exercised that degree of care for his own safety that
a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the
same circumstances, quite apart from the defective steering
mechanism. Thus, in this case, the issue whether Paglia as
plaintiff had exercised reasonable care in the operation of his
automobile, quite separate and distinct from the defective steer-
ing mechanism, and if he did not whether such lack of care was
a substantial factor in producing his damages was never submit-
ted to the jury.
Given the facts of the case, the contributory negligence was not,
as the court says, "quite separate and distinct from the defective
steering mechanism." It arose because plaintiff failed to react
reasonably to an emergency situation which was a direct result
of the defective steering mechanism. For practical purposes
Chrysler's responsibility to manufacture safe steering mecha-
nisms has been abrogated for the class of user who needs the
protection the very most-those members of the driving public
who do not react well under pressure and can be subject to a
charge of common law contributory negligence.15'
45. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 343, 344, 298 N.E.2d 622, 629, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 471 (1973).
45.1. As this article was going to print, the New York legislature approved and sent
to Governor Wilson a bill abolishing contributory negligence and assumption of risk as a
complete bar to a negligence action. New York Law Journal (May 7, 1974). Instead, the
legislature provided that when the negligence of the plaintiff is not greater than the
negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff's recovery will be diminished in proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to the plaintiff. Where there is more than one
defendant plaintiff can recover if his negligence is not greater than the negligence of all
of the named defendants.
The questions raised by this statute cannot be adequately dealt with in a footnote. It
is, however, important to note that the statute deals only with contributory negligence
and assumption of risk as a defense to a negligence action. It remains to be seen whether
the Court will apply the statute to a Codling strict liability case. This author would be
surprised if the court were to read the statute narrowly and still continue contributory
negligence and assumption of risk as an absolute bar to a products case. There is authority
from cases arising under Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972) that comparative fault will be undertaken between a negligent defen-
dant and a defendant whose liability is predicated on some form of strict liability. Walsh
v. Ford Motor Co., 70 Misc. 2d 1031, 335 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972)
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Im. BOLM AND CAMPO: THE OPEN AND OBVIOus DANGER REVISITED.
The second of the New York trilogy of products cases, Bolm
v. Triumph Corp.," will be widely noted for the proposition that
plaintiffs are entitled to recover "second collision" damages.
Henceforth a plaintiff can recover for aggravation of injuries
caused by a defect in the product even though the defect was not
the cause of the initial accident. In taking this step, New York
signficantly expanded the scope of plaintiff's recovery for injuries
caused by defective products." Then, in an about face, the court,
without discussion and without citation to the leading cases and
authorities, reaffirmed one of the most heavily criticized and ill-
starred rules extant in products literature. The court gave the
"patent-danger" rule a new lease on life.
The factual setting from which these issues evolved was a
motorcycle-automobile collision. Plaintiff, David Bolm, was seri-
ously injured when his motorcycle collided with a car which negli-
gently turned into his lane of traffic. On impact, plaintiff was
projected forward over the automobile and landed on the street.
Apparently, immediately upon impact the. plaintiffs body first
made contact with a metal luggage rack or "parcel grid" which
was affixed to the top of his motorcycle's gas tank. This parcel
grid was located about three inches above and two and three
quarter inches in front of the seat. It was plaintiff's contention
that contact with the grid caused severe pelvic and genital injur-
ies, including resultant sterility. Plaintiff brought suit against the
distributor and manufacturer of his motorcycle alleging that the
placement of the parcel grid constituted a defect in the design of
the motorcycle. Although the design defect did not cause the
and Noble v. Desco Shoe Corp., 41 App. Div. 908, 343 N.Y.S. 2d 134 (1st Dept. 1973).
See also Dipple v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Certainly the court's
invitation to the legislature in Codling to change the rules on comparative negligence
indicate a willingness to accomplish change once the mechanism for such change was
accomplished through legislation. See Samore, Codling v. Paglia: Comparative
Negligence, 38 ALBANY L. REv. 18 (1973). The above discussion does not, of course, absolve
the court from responsibility for the decision in Codling. The decision remains a bad one
and may still return to haunt us in that the court has not squarely placed the responsibil-
ity for foreseeable misuse on the manufacturing company.
46. 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973).
47. Accord, Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Mickle v.
Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969); Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729
(8th Cir. 1959); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
Grundman's v. British Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Storey v. Exhaust
Specialties & Parts, Inc., 255 Or. 151, 464 P.2d 831 (1970); Badorek v. General Motors
Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1970).
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accident, he contended that it aggravated and enhanced his inju-
ries.
As noted above, the court took this occasion to expand New
York product liability law and impose liability on a manufacturer
of a defectively designed product for "second collision" damages
which enhance injuries. Then the court turned its attention to the
nature of the defect alleged in this case-a poorly positioned par-
cel grid. Given existing New York case authority stemming from
Campo v. Scofield,4" it was crucial for the court to clearly identify
the precise kind of defect alleged. It will be recalled that in
Campo plaintiff was engaged in feeding onions into an "onion
topping" machine when his hands became caught in its revolving
steel doors and were badly injured. He brought suit against the
manufacturer of the machine alleging that it had been negligent
in failing to equip it with a guard or stopping device. The court
exonerated the manufacturer from liability on the following
grounds:49
If a manufacturer does everything necessary to make the
machine function properly for the purpose for which it is de-
signed, if the machine is without any latent defect, and if its
functioning creates no danger or peril that is not known to the
user, then the manufacturer has satisfied the law's demands.
We have not yet reached the state where a manufacturer is
under the duty of making a machine accident proof or foolproof.
Just as the manufacturer is under no obligation, in order to
guard against injury resulting from deterioration, to furnish a
machine that will not wear out (see Auld v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 288 N.Y. 515, affg. 261 App. Div. 918), so he is under no
duty to guard against injury from a patent peril or from a source
manifestly dangerous. To illustrate, the manufacturer who
makes, properly and free of defects, an axe or a buzz saw or an
airplane with an exposed propeller, is not to be held liable if one
using the axe or the buzz saw is cut by it, or if some one working
around the airplane comes in contact with the propeller. In such
cases, the manufacturer has the right to expect that such per-
sons will do everything necessary to avoid such contact, for the
very nature of the article gives notice and warning of the conse-
quences to be expected, of the injuries to be suffered. In other
words, the manufacturer is under no duty to render a machine
or other article "more" safe-as long as the danger to be avoided
is obvious and patent to all.
48. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
49. Id. at 472, 95 N.E.2d at 804 (emphasis added).
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The above-cited language had been interpreted by the Ap-
pellate Division in an earlier case as precluding "second collision"
recovery,5" and even in Bolm the Appellate Division found it nec-
essary to take a circuitous route around Campo.51 To alleviate this
problem the Court of Appeals took the occasion to clarify the
proposition that Campo is not a bar to all "second collision"
recovery. Campo, we now learn, is only a bar to liability on the
part of a manufacturer for injuries resulting from dangers which
are patent or obvious. The court emphasized: 52
While a vehicle need not be made "crashworthy", the man-
ufacturer should not be permitted to argue that a user of its
product assumes dangers from unknown or latent defects, either
in construction or design, which the manufacturer can reason-
ably foresee will cause injury on impact.
As a result of all this the issue to be decided by the jury in
Bolm on remand was whether the defect was latent or patent.5 3
If the former, recovery follows; if the latter, the defendant pre-
vails.
It might suffice at this point to question why it was that the
New York Court of Appeals in the year 1974, without citation to
50. Edgar v. Nachman, 37 A.D.2d 86, 323 N.Y.S.2d 53, motion for leave to appeal
denied 29 N.Y.2d 483, 274 N.E.2d 312, 324 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1971). In Edgar, the court, in
denying recovery, stated:
Appellant's attempt to fix liability on respondents, as stated in her proposed
amended complaint, because the gas cap flew off as the result of impact and
the gasoline tank was located in front of the vehicle does not spell out causes of
action based on either negligence or warranty. (Campo v. Scofield, supra; Inman
v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699, 143 N.E.2d
895; Walk v. J.I. Case Co., 36 A.D.2d 60, 318 N.Y.S.2d 598, mot. for lv. to app.
den. 28 N.Y.2d 487, 322 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 270 N.E.2d 904 [1971].) She does not
allege the gas cap or gas tank were defectively fabricated or installed, but only
that they were improperly designed to withstand collision and thereby the dam-
ages were increased.
Id. at 88, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
51. In sidestepping the Edgar prohibition of recovery for unsafe design characteris-
tics, which do not cause the accident but merely aggravate the injuries, the lower court
drew a distinction between essential items (such as the gas tank in Edgar) and decorative,
non-essential items (such as the luggage rack). Whereas the plaintiff in Edgar would
require the manufacturer to take affirmative steps in redesigning the automobile to lessen
the severity of the injuries, the plaintiff in Bolm "[i]s not obligating the manufacturer
to provide him with greater protection against impact, but is requiring the manufacturer
to refrain from including decorative and non-essential items which will increase his inju-
ries if he is involved in a collision." 41 A.D.2d 54, 60, 341 N.Y.S.2d 853, 846 (4th Dept.
1973).
52. 33 N.Y.2d 151, 157, 305 N.E.2d 769, 772, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 649 (1973).
53. 33 N.Y. 151, 160, 305 N.E.2d 769, 774, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 651 (1973).
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cases and authority, decided to reaffirm the Campo "patent dan-
ger" rule after it had been the subject of harsh criticism by courts
and scholars alike. 54 However, in this instance, there is even
stronger reason for questioning the affirmation of the rule: in
Bolm the fact pattern presented the archetypal case in which the
application of the "patent danger" rule has the potential of pro-
ducing a devastatingly unjust result.
The rule which denies plaintiffs recovery when the dangers
they encounter are open and obvious suffers a basic flaw. It fo-
cuses the attention of the court and jury on only one aspect of
negligence theory-the probability of the harm. In order for a
defendant's conduct to be declared negligent or a product defec-
tive and unreasonably dangerous, the conduct or product must be
measured against a standard. The negligence standard is derived
by weighing the probability and the gravity of anticipated harm
against the burden of precaution (i.e. the steps which a defendant
would have to undertake to prevent that harm from occurring)."
Similarly, with regard to defective products, one can only deter-
mine whether a product is defective by measuring the product in
question against some standard. Dean Wade has extrapolated
this notion into the following risk-utility criteria."
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its
utility to the user and the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that
it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would
meet the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe
character of the product without impairing ts usefulness or mak-
ing it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of
care in the use of the product.
54. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.5 (1956); Noel, Manufacturer's
Negligence in Design or Directions for the Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 838 (1962);
see also, Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
55. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Wade, Strict
Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 283, Comment e (1965); W. PROSSER, LAW QF TORTS 149 (4th ed. 1971).
56. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837
(1973). Contra, Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 33, 97 Cal. Rptr. 459 (Ct.
App. 3d Dist. 1971). The lower Cronin court felt that it was acceptable to define defect
without reference to 'unreasonable danger.' This decision was vacated. See Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). See also
Keeton, Strict Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973).
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(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inher-
ent in the product and their avoidability, because of general
public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of
the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of
spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying
liability insurance.
By taking into account all of the above criteria and by evalu-
ating the competing factors, it can then be determined whether
the product is or is not unreasonably dangerous. It is clear that
this process requires trade-offs. For example, a product may have
a low probability of causing harm but if harm does result the
consequences may be very serious. One cannot blithely conclude
that the product is unreasonably dangerous. It well may be that
the cost of producing a safer product is prohibitive and thus the
product may be "reasonably dangerous." Should the probability
of harm be substantial, however, then we might conclude that
even if the cost of making the product safer is high, it must be
undertaken. The risk, combined with the gravity of harm, would
be unacceptable to society, and the product would thus be de-
clared unreasonably dangerous. Note that the issue is not the
foreseeability of the defendant. The product is to be evaluated at
the time of trial to determine whether it is in fact an unreasonably
dangerous product.'"
What happens when we insist that all dangers be latent be-
fore imposing liability on a product manufacturer? Clearly the
obviousness of the danger is relevant to the determination of
whether the product is unreasonably dangerous.17 The more ob-
vious the nature of the harm, the smaller the chance that injuries
will result, since society can significantly reduce the chance that
harm will occur by using the product in a fashion which takes into
account the more obvious dangers. But that should not be the
sina qua non. Professors Harper and James put it this way:58
[T]he bottom does not logically drop out of a negligence
case against the maker when it is shown that the purchaser
knew of the dangerous condition. Thus if the product is a carrot-
56.1. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 840 and Welsh v. Outboard Marine Corp., 2 CCH PROD. LIAB. RPTR. 6940 (5th Cir.
1973).
57. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
58. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs 1543 (1956); see also Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Tort Liability, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 839-840 and 840 n.46 (1973).
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topping machine with exposed moving parts, or an electric
clothes wringer dangerous to the limbs of the operator, and if it
would be feasible for the maker of the product to install a guard
or safety release, it should be a question for the jury whether
reasonable care demanded such a precaution, though its ab-
sence is obvious. Surely reasonable men might find here a great
danger, even to one who knew the condition; and since it was
so readily avoidable they might find the maker negligent. Under
this analysis the obviousness of a condition will still preclude
liability if the obviousness justifies the conclusion that the con-
dition is not unreasonably dangerous; otherwise it would simply
be a factor to consider on the issue of negligence.
Bolm is a case in point. The parcel grid which caused plain-
tiffs injuries was described by the Appellate Division as a "deco-
rative and nonessential" item. 9 Did it not make the cycle unrea-
sonably dangerous? What societal value is there in exposing con-
sumers to this type of hazard? Admittedly the defect is obvious
but this is the very kind of case where the obviousness of the
danger will not reduce the likelihood of its occurrence. The bur-
den of precaution against the harm is simply to eradicate a nones-
sential and very dangerous feature from the cycle without impair-
ing its functional utility.
Thus, in Bolm we have a case where a jury facing the ques-
tion as to whether a parcel grid is an open and obvious danger
could respond in the affirmative." Yet, it is not unlikely that left
to grapple with the question as to whether the parcel grid was
unreasonably dangerous a jury would conclude that the probabil-
ity of the harm resulting was so high that the design should be
considered to be defective.
The obviousness of the danger can legitimately come into
play in one more aspect of the law suit. If the danger is obvious,
an argument can be made for imposing the affirmative defense
of assumption of the risk. The law has long recognized that volun-
tary assumption of a known risk is a defense to both negligence"'
59. 51 A.D.2d 54, 60, 341 N.Y.S.2d 846, 853 (1973).
60. Note that Judge Jones, in dissent in Bolm, felt that on the record of the case he
would rule as a matter of law "that plaintiff user of the motorcycle by the exercise of
reasonable care would have both discovered the defective design" and "perceived the
danger incident to its design and location." 33 N.Y.2d 151, 160, 305 N.E.2d 769, 774, 350
N.Y.S.2d 644, 651 (1973). This formulation is nothing more than the "patent danger" rule
phrased as part of the plaintiffs burden of proof, since if a danger is patent, plaintiff
should have discovered it and perceived its dangers.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (1965).
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and strict liability.2 There are, however, two factors that distin-
guish assumption of the risk from the "patent danger" rule in
cases involving open and obvious dangers. First, voluntary as-
sumption of the risk is based on plaintiff's subjective assumption
of a known risk." The inquiry is not whether a reasonable user
would have perceived the risk but whether this plaintiff did in
fact perceive it. Bolm, however, is clearly oriented toward an
objective standard. The court said it clearly:6"
Here the duty and thus, the liability of the manufacturer,
turn upon the perception of the reasonable user of the motorcy-
cle as to the dangers which inhere in the placement of the parcel
grid on top of the gas tank.
This distinction has not been lost on the defense bar. Analyz-
ing the Bolm rationale a leading defense publication offered the
following analysis: 5
When the decision is examined closely, it appears that only
two tests will be applied. The trier of fact will have to determine
if a reasonable product manufacturer should have anticipated
that, under the circumstances of the case before it, a product
user could be injured by the product or a portion thereof-even
though the product itself did not produce the accident. If the
trier of fact answers that question affirmatively (and the plain-
tiff is a living testament to the fact that such an injury can
happen), the next question will be whether a reasonable product
user should have foreseen the possibility of the same result.
It would appear that, in most cases, an affirmative answer
to the first question would require the same answer to the sec-
ond. After all, it would not take an expert in motorcycle design
and manufacture to know that when the pelvic area is smashed
into a hard object like the parcel grid, injury will result.
Furthermore, the requirement that plaintiff have a clear appre-
ciation of the precise risk66 (in order to make out the defense of
assumption of the risk) is not paralleled in the "patent danger"
rule. It is not clear that if a danger is generally patent that the
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A, Comment n, (1965).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D, Comment c (1965). See also Dorsey v.
Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
64. 33 N.Y.2d 151, 160, 305 N.E.2d 769, 774, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 651 (1973) (emphasis
added).
65. Kircher, 'Second Collision'-New Approach Attempted, 15 FOR THEDEFENSE...
9, (1974) (emphasis added).
66. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 447 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 496D, Comment b (1965).
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plaintiff will prevail by arguing that the precise danger which
developed was not patent.17 Cases have gone both ways on that
issue.6"
Second, and more important, even subjective assumption of
the risk has been questioned as a legitimate defense when it is
clear that defendant has a duty to undertake action to protect a
plaintiff against his own foolish risk-taking." In Bexiga v. Havir
Manufacturing Co.70 the New Jersey Supreme Court recently
grappled with the problem. Plaintiff, John Bexiga, Jr., 18 years
of age, was employed by the Regina Corporation as a power punch
press operator. The ten-ton punch press that he was operating
was manufactured by the defendant Havir and was almost totally
devoid of safety features. Plaintiff testified that the particular
operation he was directed to do required him to place round metal
discs, about three inches in diameter, one at a time by hand, on
top of the die. He would then depress a foot pedal thereby activat-
ing the machine. This caused a ram to descend about five inches
and punch two holes in the disc. After this operation the ram
would ascend and the equipment on the press would remove the
metal disc and blow the trimmings away so that the die would
be clean for the next cycle. The entire cycle just described would
take about ten seconds. Plaintiff, John Jr., related the events
leading up to the accident as follows: 7'
Well, I put the round piece of metal on the die and the
metal did not go right to the place. I was taking my hand off
the machine and I noticed that a piece of metal wasn't in place
so I went right back to correct it, but at the same time, my foot
had gone to the pedal, so I tried to take my hand off and jerk
my foot off too and it was too late. My hand had gotten cut on
the punch, the ram.
67. It will be recalled that in Messina v. Clark Equipment Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.
1959) Judge Clark argued unsuccessfully in dissent that Campo "did not shift the basic
inquiry as to the reasonable foreseeability of the danger to a sterile definitional quibble
over whether the injury was caused by a "latent" or a "patent" defect." Id. at 293. The
majority thought otherwise and denied plaintiff a recovery on a highly foreseeable risk
simply on the ground of patency.
68. See, e.g., Poretz v. R.H. Macy & Co. Inc., 119 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1953);
Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d
699 (1957). Compare Walk v. J.I. Case Co., 36 App. Div.2d 60, 318 N.Y.S.2d 598 (3rd Dept.
1971).
69. See Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask: Restructuring Assumption of Risk, 60
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1974); James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE
L.J. 185 (1968).
70. 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
71. Id. at 406, 290 A.2d at 283.
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Plaintiff's expert testified that the punch press amounted to
a "booby trap" because there were no safety devices in its basic
design. He described two different types of protective safety de-
vices both of which were known in the industry at the time of the
manufacture and sale of the defective press. One was a push-
button device with buttons so spaced as to require the operator
to place both hands on them away from the die area to set the
machine in motion. The purpose of such a safety device would be
to render the machine immune from the momentary forgetfulness
or inadvertance of its operator and to assure that his hands would
be away from the die when the press was operational. The New
Jersey Supreme Court found that a jury might well find the de-
fendant negligent or the machine unreasonably dangerous be-
cause of its defective design. Having faced the duty issue the
court was concerned that the plaintiff might be dismissed on the
basis of his contributory negligence in activating the foot pedal
of the machine. Indeed, the problem could be more serious for
there is an argument to be made that plaintiff had voluntarily
and unreasonably assumed a known risk.7" The plaintiff had oper-
ated the machine for forty minutes and he well knew the implica-
tions of permitting the weight of a ten-ton press converging on his
hand if he accidentally engaged the foot pedal while his hand was
on the die. What is important though is the reason the court
rejected the contributory negligence defense. The logic is
irrefutable:7 3
The asserted negligence of plaintiff-placing his hand
under the ram while at the same time depressing the foot
pedal-was the very eventuality the safety devices were de-
signed to guard against. It would be anomalous to hold that
defendant has a duty to install safety devices but a breach of
that duty results in no liability for the very injury the duty was
meant to protect against.
If the Bexiga case had been before the New York court, would
plaintiff not have to convince the court that the machine defect
was latent? If this were his burden, he might very well fail. The
issue of the unreasonable danger of the defect might never reach
72. Since New Jersey recognizes a broad range of plaintiff's negligent conduct as a
defense to even strict liability, the court was not forced to distinguish between voluntary
and unreasonable assumption of a known risk and product misuse. See Ettin v. Ava Truck
Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463, 251 A.2d 278 (1969); Mairoino v. Weco Products Co., 45 N.J.
570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965).
73. 60 N.J. 402, 412, 290 A.2d 281, 286 (1972) (emphasis added).
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the jury. The manufacturer's duty to design a safe machine would
be washed away by the patency of the danger. The "patent dan-
ger" rule, as a threshold requirement for recovery, although
within the province of the jury,74 raises the wrong issue at the
wrong time. The focus today must be on the unreasonable design
of the product and why it is unreasonably dangerous. The case
for the abolition of the latency requirement is a strong one indeed.
If after almost two decades of sharp criticism it is being reaf-
firmed, we at least deserve to know what motivated the court to
do so. Bolm offers no answer.
IV. VELEZ AND THE DISCLAIMER PROBLEM
Velez serves as a fitting third to the triptych of New York
products cases. The court eschewed deciding the case on narrow
grounds and sought to set forth its general approach to disclaimer
law. Alas, the court sought to accomplish this feat in three short
paragraphs. It cannot be done. The price to be paid in future
years for this improvident discussion of disclaimer law may be
very high. The chances are good that plaintiffs will suffer need-
lessly from some very loose language in Velez which apparently
recognizes the validity of disclaimers in strict products liability
cases. And all this without a single citation to case law or the
leading authorities that have discussed this most complex prob-
lem at length.75
The Velez facts are simple. The job superintendent for a
contractor ordered a quantity of lumber from the defendant lum-
ber company. The superintendent claimed that he specified that
the lumber was to be scaffold planking. Defendant's vice-
president, who took the order, contended that the order was for
rough spruce planking and that he had not been given any indica-
tion of how the planking was to be used. The planking was deliv-
ered and later put to scaffolding use. Plaintiffs, a carpenter and
74. 33 N.Y.2d 151, 155, 305 N.E.2d 769, 771, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 648 (1973).
75. See, e.g., Markle v. Mulholland's Inc., 509 P.2d 529 (Ore. 1973); Hawkins Const.
Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973). See generally, Franklin, When
Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN.
L. REv. 974 (1966); Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrast Be.
tween the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 692
(1965); Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communications
Barriers, 17 CASE W. Rs. L. REv. 5 (1965); Murray, Pennsylvania Products Liability: A
Clarification of the Search for a Clear and Understandable Rule, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 391
(1972); Murray, Products Liability-Another Word, 35 U. Pr-r. L. Rzv. 255 (1973); Mur-
ray, Random Thoughts on Mendel, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. Rsv. 86 (1970).
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a laborer, stepped out on the plank platform at the same time. A
few seconds later a plank cracked causing plaintiffs to fall some
25 to 30 feet to the foundation below. The uncontroverted testi-
mony was that the plank which broke was rotted on one side with
a split all the way across the rotted area.
Plaintiffs brought the action against the defendant lumber
company on both negligence and breach of warranty grounds.
The trial court dismissed the negligence cause of action and
plaintiff ultimately won a verdict on warranty grounds alone. As
to the breach of warranty charge plaintiff was faced with a dis-
claimer problem. The invoice for the lumber which was received
in evidence bore the following legend in large capital letters:
"NO CLAIMS ALLOWED UNLESS MADE IMMEDIATELY
AFTER DELIVERY"
Immediately below this legend appeared the following:
"NOTE-The purchaser shall be deemed to have accepted
these goods as is, the seller having made no representations or
warranties whatsoever with respect to their quality, fitness for
use, or in any other regard thereto."
The word "NOTE" was printed in the largest type used in the
body of the invoice, but the text of the disclaimer is printed in
the smallest type used on the invoice.
76
Plaintiffs contended that the disclaimer should be disre-
garded because it did not meet the Uniform Commercial Code
requirement that it be "conspicuous." Although the trial court
sustained this contention, the Court of Appeals decided to bypass
this issue and face the validity of a disclaimer to a non-bargaining
third party. The court concluded that a disclaimer would not be
effective. It reasoned as follows:
7
Subdivision (2) of section 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial
Code in pertinent part provides: "to exclude or modify the im-
plied warranty of merchantability of any part of it the language
must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of
fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.
Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is suffi-
cient if it states, for example, that 'there are no warranties
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof.'" This
provision is obviously addressed to the language and form to be
76. 33 N.Y.2d 117, 120, 305 N.E.2d 750, 751, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 619 (1973).
77. Id. at 124, 305 N.E.2d at 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
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used if any exclusion of warranties is to be effective. The section
does not undertake, nor does any other section of the code un-
dertake, to specify who shall and who shall not be bound by an
exclusion of warranties which meets the requirements of section
2-316.
We are then thrown back on broad principles of contract
law. Although strict products liability sounds in tort rather than
in contract, we see no reason why in the absence of some consid-
eration of public policy parties cannot by contract restrict or
modify what would otherwise be a liability between them
grounded in tort.
In this case, however, we find no basis for holding that these
plaintiffs should be barred from recovery by reason of the im-
print of the exclusion of warranties legend on the invoice in this
case. Plaintiffs were complete strangers to the contract; there is
no evidence that either of them ever saw the invoice in question
or knew of its contents. No authorities or rationale are tendered
to support the extension of the disclaimer to plaintiffs with ref-
erence to claims predicated on strict products liability. We agree
with the position of the dissenters at the Appellate Division that
these plaintiffs were not bound by the terms of the contract
between their employer and defendant lumber company. We see
no necessity to labor the point that, in the absence of special
circumstances not present here, buyer and seller cannot con-
tract to limit the seller's exposure under strict products liability
to an innocent user or bystander.
Before beginning the discussion of the above paragraphs a
disclaimer is in order. A full-blown analysis of disclaimer law will
not be forthcoming-the format of this article does not permit it.
What follows rather are some questions which seek to probe the
accuracy of the court's pronouncements.
First, the Court states that neither § 2-316 of the U. C. C. nor
any other section undertakes to specify who shall and who shall
not be bound by an exclusion of warranties which meets the re-
quirements of § 2-316. Admittedly § 2-316 does not address itself
to this problem, but one need not look far to find a discussion of
the question. Section 2-318 provides as follows:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer
or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that
such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
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The first comment to § 2-318 discusses within the context of a
third party beneficiary the very problem which the court implies
the Code does not consider. The comment reads:
The last sentence of this section does not mean that a seller
is precluded from excluding or disclaiming a warranty which
might otherwise arise in connection with the sale provided such
exclusion or modification is permitted by Section 2-316. Nor
does that sentence preclude the seller from limiting the reme-
dies of his own buyer and of any beneficiaries, in any manner
provided in Sections 2-718 or 2-719. To the extent that the con-
tract of sale contains provisions under which warranties are ex-
cluded or modified, or remedies for breach are limited, such
provisions are equally operative against beneficiaries of warran-
ties under this section. What this last sentence forbids is exclu-
sion of liability by the seller to the persons to whom the warran-
ties which he has made to his buyer would extend under this
section. (emphasis added)
The Code's position is clear: the only time a warranty will flow
to a non-privity plaintiff is when there exists a warranty to the
party in privity. Since the New York court appears to take the
position that a disclaimer of tort liability is valid with regard to
the parties to the contract it would appear that the Velez plain-
tiffs should be precluded from recovering. 8
Second, the court throughout discusses the breach of war-
ranty question without particularizing the warranty under con-
sideration. The trial court opinion, however, indicates that the
case was submitted to the jury on grounds of breach of implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (U. C. C. § 2-315).11
Even if one were to conclude that one can disclaim liability to the
immediate purchaser and still be held liable to a non-bargaining
third party for breach of implied warranty of merchantability, it
makes little sense to apply this principle to the warranty of fit-
ness. Once one has properly disclaimed the warranty of fitness to
his immediate buyer and that disclaimer is valid even for tort
purposes (as the court assumes it is), it makes no sense to con-
clude that the warranty of fitness will pass on to a non-bargaining
third party. The warranty of fitness can only pass on to a third
party through the reliance of the bargaining party." Once the
78. Cf. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABIUTY § 16A [4] (1973).
79. 326 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Kings Cty. 1971).
80. Reliance is an element in proving a breach of implied warranty of fitness. U.C.C.
§ 2-315. See also, J. WHrrE and R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 296 (1972); 2 L.
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 16A[5][d] (1973).
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bargaining parties have disclaimed, liability would appear to be
at an end.
The most important question to be faced in this entire mat-
ter, however, is not liability to third party strangers, but rather
the validity of the basic disclaimer. If the disclaimer is invalid,
then there is hardly a question as to its applicability to a third
party stranger. As noted above, the court takes the position that
it sees "no reason why in the absence of some consideration of
public policy parties cannot by contract restrict or modify what
would otherwise be a liability between them grounded in tort."',
It would appear that the court has signaled that absent some
very special circumstances disclaimers between parties in privity
will be recognized even in personal injury cases. If this is the
court's true intent, the development is most unfortunate for prod-
uct litigants in New York. One is left to wonder why the court
chose to disregard the rather substantial opposition to tort dis-
claimer which had developed over the past decade.2
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, which gave strong impe-
tus to the entire strict liability movement took great pains to
develop the field independent of commercial law doctrine so that
consumers would not be affected by U. C. C. limitations on recov-
ery such as notice of breach and disclaimers. The Restatement
position is clear-strict tort liability cannot be disclaimed. 3 In
fact, authorities have agreed that strict liability in tort is "hardly
more than what exists under implied warranty when stripped of
the contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer, requirements of no-
tice of defect and limitation through inconsistencies with express
warranties. '84 Very simply, we must assume that moving strict
liability into tort, as the court has apparently done,85 and away
from the Code must have been to foster some goal. If Code defen-
ses can be asserted, what has been accomplished by the move to
the tort analysis?
The court intimates that the only reason that the U. C. C.
does not apply to the third party stranger is that there is no
81. 33 N.Y. 2d 117, 125, 305 N.E.2d 750, 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 623 (1973).
82. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 391 P.2d 168 (1964); Haley v. Merit
Chevrolet, Inc., 67 IIl.App.2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m, (1965).
84. Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965); see also,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
85. See discussion supra. If in fact the court is still clinging to the Code for
product defenses, then the problem discussed infra becomes more pronounced.
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provision of the Code that governs. The inference at this point is
that the U. C. C. will govern when its provisions are applicable. If
so, then how does one explain the court's statement that it sees
no reason why "parties cannot by contract restrict or modify what
would otherwise be a liability between them grounded in tort"?
Section 2-719(3) provides:
Consequential damages may be.limited or excluded unless
the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of con-
sequential damages for injury to the person in the case of con-
sumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of
damages where the loss is commercial is not.
There has been substantial controversy over the meaning of
this section. Comment 3 to this section indicates that the section
applies only to the issue of limitation or exclusion of remedies and
that a seller "in all cases is free to disclaim warranties in the
manner provided in Section 2-316." If comment 3 means what it
says, then the Code has taken the position that a total disclaimer
of warranties may operate to bar recovery in personal injury but
that a limitation of remedy is prima facie unconscionable. The
anomaly of this position has not been lost on cognoscenti of the
Code.86 Be that as it may, we cannot escape the Code language
that parties are not generally free to limit or exclude remedies
when personal injury is the issue at stake. How then does the
Court of Appeals square the Code attitude of prima facie uncon-
scionability with regard to modification of remedies with its own
position that parties are free, absent special consideration, to
modify or restrict their tort liability. There remains the possibil-
ity that the "considerations of public policy" to which the court
refers is the "prima facie unconscionability" posture of the
U. C. C. To make the statement is to refute it-the Court of Ap-
peals has set forth a general attitude of approval of contractual
clauses which modify tort remedies. The Code in § 2-719 has, at
the very least, taken a position against the validity of limitation
of remedy clauses.
We are at an impasse. If the court in Codling shifted to a tort
theory, its purpose must have been to accomplish a goal which it
felt was foreclosed by the U. C. C. Clearly, privity could have been
86. See Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the
Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERs L. REv. 692 (1965);
Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Product
Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966). See also, J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMER-
CIAL CODE 386 (1972).
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abolished with the blessing of the Code. 7 Notice of defect pre-
sents no substantial obstacles even under a Code orientation,
since the Code makes specific exceptions for the non-commercial
consumer.8 1 If the purpose was to bypass the disclaimer prob-
lem-the court has not done so. Instead it has decided to engage
that problem in its own special fashion. We are truly at a loss to
discover the direction of the court. The policy considerations
which might upset a disclaimer or a limitation of remedy are not
articulated by the court. Will the superior bargaining power of the
seller be such a consideration? Will the ability of the buyer to
truly fathom the risk which he has decided to bear be a factor?
The court has decided that a general statement favoring dis-
claimers in products cases is to be our only guideline for the
present. It is inevitable that this language will cut hard against
injured plaintiffs until further clarification is forthcoming.
CONCLUSION
Codling, Bolm, and Velez brought New York product liabil-
ity law into line with other leading courts throughout the country
who had already committed themselves to a strict liability tort
analysis. But, each of the decisions either created or retained
some antiquated concepts as part of New York products doctrine.
Age and wisdom are not antithetical. However, if the court wishes
to retain old concepts (which have been heavily attacked) as part
of New York products jurisprudence, then we should be told what
goals the court hopes to foster by their retention. Otherwise the
result will be a steady flow of cases through the appellate system
designed to test whether the court really meant to place New
York product liability law at variance with the developing na-
tional case law.
87. U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment 3. See also Murray, Pennsylvania Products Liability:
A Clarification of the Search for a Clear and Understandable Rule, 33 U. Pn-r. L. REv.
391 (1972).
88. U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4. See also Murray, Random Thoughts on Mendel, 45
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 86 (1970).
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